With Trump’s successful intervention in Venezuela, and a recent statement that he is prepared to take control of Greenland “the hard way”, the US threat on Greenland is growing.
Trump is keen to control Greenland for several reasons. Greenland is strategically important; sandwiched between the Arctic and North America, it is useful for the early monitoring, altering of and responding to missile attacks on the US. The territory is also resource rich; being home to 43 of the 50 key minerals needed to put states ahead in leading technological advancements in the next decade. With this, Trump has espoused concern over Denmark’s ability to protect Greenland from China and Russia. Talk from Trump of Russia being an existential threat to Greenland is ironic. Presently, the US is not taking Russia’s existential threat towards Ukraine seriously, and right now, the US, not Russia is the one presenting an existential threat to Greenland and its sovereignty. There is also no doubt that adding Greenland to the US’ territory is a legacy Trump would not mind leaving behind and is a sure motivator of his actions. Now, if the US acts on its concerns, in theory it would be easy for it to take Greenland militarily. However, because Denmark is a part of NATO and controls Greenland, the question of whether NATO should and would be willing to defend Greenland from US attack is up in the air. The following article will discuss the response of NATO member states to Trump’s increasingly aggressive approach towards Greenland.
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First, whether an attack on a NATO member by another NATO member would spell the end of the alliance in its current form is disputed. NATO survived Turkey’s attack on Greek ally, Cyprus, without military intervention and through mediation by NATO members. However, an attack on Greenland by NATO’s largest and most powerful member paints a different picture. Although no provision in the alliances’ 1949 founding treaty covers what response Article 5 would demand in this eventuality, senior US democrat Luscombe and NATO diplomats have said that the alliance would end as the US would be at war with the remaining members of the alliance, including the United Kingdom and France. Trump has said that the US may have to choose between keeping the alliance intact or seizing Greenland.
Thus, the question of European defence of Greenland is very relevant to the future of the alliance and is a great test of European strength in itself. However, in a world of big power politics, Europe has shown itself to be weak in response to Trump’s provocations over the course of his second presidential term. To the major European actors, salvaging US-European relations over standing up to Trump has been more important. This priority is shown in their recent statements on the Greenland issue. NATO Secretary General Rutte has not criticised Trump, rather his line is that Europe should strengthen its position in the high arctic. Whilst European leaders like Starmer and Merz have maintained that Denmark and Greenland should be the deciders of the territories’ fate, they have also echoed Rutte’s line that Europe should make greater efforts to secure Greenland in response to Trump’s argument that Denmark is not doing a good enough job. Nielsen, Greenland’s prime minister, has stressed that Greenland is a democratic society with a right to make its own decisions and that he wants to work closer with Denmark to step up defence in line with NATO members. Unfortunately for Denmark and Greenland’s officials, Trump’s insistence that only the US can provide the security Greenland’s needs makes future European efforts to step up security likely futile at quelling Trump’s desire to take Greenland.
European weakness on Trump’s threats towards Greenland have once again highlighted their hesitance towards standing up for their allies. This is hardly surprising; the risk for Europe’s great powers, England, Germany and France, of destroying their relations with the US is front and centre to their foreign policy decisions, however discouraging and frustrating this can sometimes be.